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INTRODUCTION 
The Amazing Spider-man.  The X-Men.  The Incredible 
Hulk.  You would be hard-pressed to find someone who does 
not recognize these and a number of the other iconic 
characters that found their origins on the panel of a comic 
book.  From their somewhat humble beginnings, comic book 
characters have grown into some of the most prevalent—and 
lucrative—icons in our popular culture.  They have 
transcended the printed page and have spread into almost all 
forms of media.  Publishing giants Marvel Worldwide, Inc. 
(“Marvel”), and DC Comics, Inc. (“DC Comics”), have likewise 
become household names through the popularity of their 
properties.  However, one major group of people is not very 
satisfied with this state of affairs: a seemingly growing 
number of the original artists and writers—and their 
estates—who contributed to the creation of some of these 
beloved characters. 
Members of this group claim that they have not received 
their due recognition and/or compensation, falling victim to 
the inadequate bargaining power sometimes inherent in the 
publisher-author relationship.1  These creators have come to 
rely on the termination provisions of the Copyright Act of 
1976 (“1976 Act”)2 in their attempts to rectify deals that have 
proven to be ill-advised.  Congress drafted the termination 
provisions of the 1976 Act specifically to remedy situations in 
which an author suffered from his or her unequal bargaining 
position, resulting in part from the inability to determine a 
work’s value until it has been exploited.3  When termination 
is successfully exercised, the grantor reclaims the copyrights 
that he had conveyed, placing himself in a position where he 
may now obtain remuneration for the work.  A key 
consideration in such cases will often be whether the work in 
question was made on a “for-hire” basis.  Works-for-hire are 
explicitly exempt from termination under the 1976 Act, 
because the person or entity commissioning the work is 
deemed to be the statutory “author” and owns the copyright in 
 
 1.  See e.g., Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 2.  17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2012). 
 3.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5740. 
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the work, rather than the creator.4  Thus, if it can be 
established that a work was in fact one created “for-hire,” an 
attempted termination of copyright transfer will fail because 
the original creator technically never owned the copyright nor 
had the ability to transfer or assign the rights to the work. 
In September of 2009, the heirs of legendary comic book 
artist Jack Kirby served Marvel and its licensees Sony (for 
Spider-man), Fox (for X-men), Universal, and others with 
termination notices for 45 works published by Marvel 
between 1958 and 1963.5  Marvel sued in 2010, seeking 
declaratory judgment that the termination notices were a 
nullity since Marvel owned the copyrights to the works.6  The 
Kirby heirs counterclaimed for a declaration that the notices 
were not a nullity and that they now held the copyrights.7 
The Southern District of New York disagreed with the 
contentions of the Kirby estate, and in Marvel Worldwide, Inc. 
v. Kirby, decided July 28, 2011, Judge Colleen McMahon 
found that the materials in question were works-for-hire, 
preventing the Kirby heirs from reclaiming the copyright on 
his creations under the termination provisions of the 1976 
Act.8  Since the works were created prior to January 1, 1978, 
the date that the 1976 Act went into effect, the court had to 
conduct its work-for-hire analysis pursuant to its statutory 
predecessor, the Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”).9  In the 
end, the court found that none of the evidence submitted 
could make “so much as a dent in the ‘almost irrebuttable’ 
presumption that the Kirby works were works-for-hire.”10  
The lawyer representing the Kirby estate, Marc Toberoff, has 
expressed his disagreement with the court’s decision, citing 
what he called the “arcane and contradictory state of ‘work for 
hire’ caselaw under the 1909 Copyright Act.”11  He has 
indicated that he intends to appeal the decision to the Second 
 
 4.  17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 203, 304(c) (2006). 
 5.  Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); 
Matthew Belloni, Jack Kirby Estate Vows to Appeal Loss in Marvel Copyright Lawsuit, 
THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (July 28, 2011), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-
esq/jack-kirby-estate-vows-appeal-216642. 
 6.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 725. 
 7.  Id.  
 8.  Id. at 750. 
 9.  Id. at 737.  For a discussion on how the two acts differ, see infra Part II. 
 10.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 750. 
 11.  Belloni, supra note 5. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals.12 
This Note will examine the Southern District of New 
York’s decision in Kirby and will ultimately conclude that the 
decision of the court is wholly consistent with the aims of 
copyright law and beneficial for the continued survival and 
prosperity of the comic book industry.  To provide insight into 
the underlying principles behind the 1976 Act’s termination 
provisions, Part I of this note will trace American copyright 
law from its goals and underlying rationale to its 
implementation through the various copyright acts.  
Particular attention will be given to rationale supporting the 
changes that have been made and Congress’s desire to 
address opportunities afforded to an author to gain 
remuneration for a work that has been transferred to another.  
Part II will examine and compare the work-for-hire doctrine 
under both the1909 Act and the 1976 Act, specifically focusing 
on the analysis utilized by courts within the Second Circuit.  
Part III will outline the background of the Kirby case and the 
decision that the Southern District of New York rendered, 
focusing on how the court applied the work-for-hire analysis 
to the facts of the case and the reasoning that the court relied 
on in reaching its judgment.  
I. RENEWAL AND TERMINATION: THE AUTHOR’S ABILITY TO GAIN 
REMUNERATION FOR WORKS ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER PARTY 
A. The True Purpose of Copyright Law 
Copyright finds it origins in what is widely known as the 
“Copyright Clause.”13  Under this provision, Congress has the 
power "to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries."14  It is pursuant to this clause and the Necessary 
and Proper Clause15 that Congress can enact copyright 
legislation.16  Copyright can provide the holder with an 
 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 16.  Scott T. Okamoto, Musical Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire: Money 
for Nothing, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 783, 785 (2003) (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
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immensely valuable piece of intellectual property.  Authors 
are conferred the right to reproduce their work, prepare 
derivative works based on the copyrighted work, distribute 
copies of their work, perform or display the work publicly, 
and, importantly, copyright owners can also assign the 
copyright in their works to another.17 
Deconstructing the ideology behind American copyright 
law is an intriguing endeavor.  It uncovers certain truths 
about American values, society, and business, yet it can be 
equally sobering as one reflects on what copyright actually 
seeks to protect.  One may think that copyright exists for the 
benefit of the author or creator of a piece.  However, in 
actuality “[t]he primary purpose of copyright is not to reward 
the author, but is rather to secure ‘the general benefits 
derived by the public from the labors of authors.’”18  Reward 
to the owner is merely a secondary consideration.19  The 
prospect of reward serves the purpose of inducing the author 
to release to the public the “products of his creative genius.”20  
As articulated by the Supreme Court, “encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance 
public welfare through the talents of authors.”21  Thus, 
through copyright, authors are provided with limited 
monopoly in their works in order to encourage them to release 
those works to the public.22 
This is not a universal view taken by all countries towards 
copyright.  In fact, European copyright law significantly 
differs from American copyright law in its recognition of 
moral rights, stemming from a “fundamentally divergent view 
of the nature of media, whether art is seen as a cultural 
production or merely creative goods.”23  American copyright 
 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.02 (2011)(1963) (hereinafter “NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT”)). 
 17.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 18.  1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03; see Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 
(1932). 
 19.  United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). 
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 22.  Ashok Chandra, Crisis of Indefinite Consequence: How the Derivative Works 
Exception and the Lanham Act Undercut the Remunerative Value of Termination of 
Transfers,16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 241, 250 (2005) (citing 
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158). 
 23.  Sean McGilvray, Judicial Kryptonite?: Superman and the Consideration of 
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law has its roots in “consequentialist, economic, and 
incentive-based justifications while continental European 
copyright law is informed to a greater degree by natural 
rights and concern to protect the personality interests of the 
author.”24  The result is that European intellectual property 
regimes justify copyright, along with trademark and patent 
law, as protecting the creator and his work.25  Nonetheless, 
some scholars have argued that American copyright does not 
necessarily reject natural law concepts completely.26 
True, there is not a complete disconnect between American 
law and moral rights.  The United States officially recognizes 
some traditional moral rights such as the “Right of 
Authorship”27 and the “Right of Integrity,”28 however these 
protections are limited to visual artists.29  Authors have also 
utilized other aspects of American law for protection akin to 
those that would be afforded by moral rights.30  For example, 
the American system’s prohibition on specifically enforcing 
personal service contracts affords creators of works similar 
protection to the “Right to Create,” which “prohibit[s] the 
completion of a work from being judicially mandated.”31  One 
may also rely on libel law for the same or similar protections 
as the “Right of Protection from Excessive Criticism.”32  In 
combating distortions of their work, sometimes creators and 
entertainers have been able to find relief under the Lanham 
 
Moral Rights in American Copyright, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 319, 325 (2010). 
 24.  Id. (quoting Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar 
“Gap,” 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659, 662 (2007). 
 25.  McGilvray supra note 23, at 326 (citing F. Willem Grosheide, Paradigms in 
Copyright Law, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 205, 207 
(Brad Sherman & Alan Strowel eds., 1994). 
 26.  MARGETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 403 (3d 
ed. 2007). 
 27.  “Permitting the author to be recognized as author of created work, to publish 
as anonymous or pseudonymous, to prevent work from being attributed to another, and 
to prevent name from being used on works not created, or distorted.”  SHERRI L. BURR, 
ENTERTAINMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS IN ESTABLISHED AND EMERGING MEDIA 
116 (2d. ed. 2011). 
 28.  “Permitting the author to prevent alterations, distortions or destruction of his 
work.”  Burr, supra note 27. 
 29.  17 U.S.C. § 106A; Burr, supra note 27, at 116 (citing Sherri L. Burr, 
Introducing Art Law, 37 COPYRIGHT WORLD 22, 24 (Feb. 1994). 
 30.  Burr, supra note 27, at 116. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
MURRAY_HEROES FOR HI RE 4/17/2013  4:07 PM 
2013] Heroes for Hire 417 
 
Act, which “prohibits false designation of origin and false 
description.”33 
Still, aside from these limited exceptions and roundabout 
ways of invoking the effective equivalent of the protections 
that would be afforded by moral rights, the “[American] 
regulatory [system] is reluctant to acknowledge these 
rights.”34  Courts have consistently avoided and rejected 
explicit attempts to appeal to moral rights.35  Yet scholars and 
commentators concur that moral rights do have a place within 
American copyright law, albeit a discrete one, typically 
hidden behind the mask of other laws.36  Given the status of 
moral rights within American copyright law, it should be no 
surprise then that there is no clear answer as to what extent, 
if any, these considerations actually affect judicial decision-
making. 
Cases of copyright transfer termination under the 1976 
Act present an intriguing context in which to apply this 
question.  In these cases, an author is seeking to reclaim a 
copyright in a work he has previously assigned to another 
entity.  Thus, it is an apt situation in which moral rights may 
hold sway and the argument that such cases implicitly 
address the moral right of an author to his work has been 
made.37 
 
 33.  Id. at 117 (citing Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (ABC television 
network enjoined from airing their editing of Monty Python television program); 15 
U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). 
 34.  Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1294-95 (2003) (noting the limited scope of 17 U.S.C. § 106A 
(2000)). 
 35.  See Miller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 299 F.2d 706, 709 n.5 (2d Cir. 
1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962) (“In any event, the moral right [to prevent the 
‘distortion, mutilation or other alteration’ of an author’s work] is not recognized in this 
country.”); Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590 (2d Cir. 1952) (granting relief based on a 
contract theory rather than addressing the doctrine of moral rights); Vargas v. Esquire, 
164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to utilize moral rights 
law as recognized by civil law in other countries as an attempt to change the law of this 
country); Seroff v. Simon & Schuster, 162 N.Y.S.2d 770, 778 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff’d, 210 
N.Y.S.2d 479 (1960) (author could not hold publisher liable for damage to reputation 
from distorted translation of author’s book).  
 36.  See Jonathan Stuart Pink, Moral Rights: A Conflict Between the United States 
and Canada, 1 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 171, 178 (1994); Roberta Rosentha Kwall, 
Copyright and the Moral Right: Is An American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 
17-24 (1985). 
 37.  McGilvray, supra note 23, at 320. 
MURRAY_HEROES FOR HI RE 4/17/2013  4:07 PM 
418 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 23.2 
 
B. The 1790 Act through the 1909 Act 
The termination rights now afforded to authors were not 
always a part of American copyright law.  Like most areas of 
law, copyright has changed and evolved with time.  Unlike 
other areas of law, such as contract, copyright itself is a 
creature of statute.38  Congress first utilized the powers 
granted to it by the Copyright Clause through the enactment 
of the Copyright Act of 1790 (“1790 Act”), which was modeled 
after England’s Statute of Anne.39 
The 1790 Act provided for an initial 14 years of protection 
with the option to renew the copyright for an additional 14 
years.40  Originally, the purpose of the renewal right was 
“merely to serve as an extension of the original term.”41  Upon 
expiration of the original term, the author or the author's 
executors, administrators, or assignees could effectuate the 
renewal of the copyright.42  In regards to the renewal term, 
there was no reference in the statute to members of the 
author’s family, or to any party that was not in the line of 
succession.43  Instead, the first section of the statute provided 
that a copyright could be obtained by “a citizen or citizens,” or 
“his or their executors, administrators, or assigns,” and then, 
in the same section, the 1790 Act granted to such persons a 
further term of 14 years.44  Furthermore, there was no 
indication that when an author made an assignment this 
transfer would not also include any “extensions, 
improvements, and all other incidentals” to the copyright.45  
Thus, when an author transferred his copyright, there was no 
 
 38.  Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 663-64 (1834) (“This right [in copyright] . . . 
does not exist at common law—it originated, if at all, under the acts of congress.”); M. 
Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 432 (4th Cir. 1986) (“The right of copyright 
is a creature of federal statute, with its constitutional base in Article I, § 8, cl. 8.”); 
Microsoft Corp. v. Grey Computer, 910 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (D. Md. 1995) (“Unlike 
contracts, copyrights and the rights flowing therefrom are entirely creatures of 
statute. . .”). 
 39.  Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (May 31, 1790) (repealed 1909), reprinted in 
8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 7[D][1]; Statute of Anne, 8 Anne c. 19, (1790) (repealed 
1842), reprinted in 8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 7[A]. 
 40.  Copyright Act of 1790 § 1.   
 41.  Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 217 (1990) (citing Copyright Act of 1790 § 1).   
 42.  Stewart, 495 U.S. at 217 (citing Copyright Act of 1790 § 1). 
 43.  White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 250 (1st Cir. 1911). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
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reason to believe that the assignee would not also gain the 
right to renewal.46 
Congress altered the renewal rights granted in the 
Copyright Act in 1831, and again in 1870; resulting in a 
provision which granted to “the author, inventor, or designer,” 
if living, or “his widow or children, if he be dead” the exclusive 
right of renewal for the additional 14-year period.47  This 
created a new policy in which the original and renewal terms 
of a copyright were clearly broken up and the right to renewal 
would revert back to the author or his family upon expiration 
of the first term.48  By doing this, Congress was endeavoring 
to provide the author with a second chance to control and 
benefit from his work and sought “to secure to the author's 
family the opportunity to exploit the work if the author died 
before he could register for the renewal term.”49 
Congress once again took legislative action with the 1909 
Act.  This Act would follow its predecessors in providing the 
author with an initial copyright period, now extended to 28 
years from the date of publication, and a renewal period for a 
second 28-year period upon the expiration of the first term.50  
In the debates leading up to the 1909 Act’s enactment, 
Congress determined that the two-term scheme should be 
retained in order to address the inequality often present in 
the bargaining power between the author and the publisher.51  
This scheme would help protect authors who sell their 
copyrights, for a relatively small sum of money, to publishers 
who go on to reap enormous profits.52 
 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Copyright Act of February 3, 1831, 4 Stat. 36, reprinted in 8 NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT app. 7[D][4]; Copyright Act of 1870 § 88, reprinted in 8 NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT app. 7[D][13][a][Sec. 88]. 
 48.  Goff, 187 F. at 250. 
 49.  Stewart, 495 U.S. at 218 (citing Seymour M. Bricker, Renewal and Extension of 
Copyright, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 27 (1955) (“The renewal term of copyright is the law’s 
second chance to the author and his family to profit from his mental labors”)). 
 50.  17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909 Act) (replaced by the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 
101, et seq.), reprinted in 8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT app. 6 § 24 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2011) (1963). 
 51.  H.R. REP. NO. 2222 at 14 (1909) (“It not infrequently happens that the author 
sells his copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum.  If the work 
proves to be a great success and lives beyond the term of twenty-eight years, . . . it 
should be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term, and the law should 
be framed . . . so that [the author] could not be deprived of that right.”).  
 52.  Id. 
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The renewal term in effect created a new estate: one “clear 
of all rights, interests, or licenses granted under the original 
copyright.”53  It provided a safeguard in the form of an escape 
hatch for authors who have made poor bargaining decisions.54  
The author or his family would be able to “get the benefit of 
the last half of the monopoly if the work [has] prove[n] [to be] 
a protracted success.”55  It would allow the author to bargain 
on more equal footing with the assignee, and fairly 
renegotiate the terms of the grant after the value of the work 
has been determined through its exploitation during the 
initial term.56 
Unfortunately, this proved to be a flawed system, and in 
Fred Fischer Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, the Supreme 
Court rendered a decision that effectively eliminated the 
purpose of the renewal right as Congress had envisioned.57  
The Court held that the second term of copyright was 
assignable during the first term.58  As a result of this decision, 
publishers simply began requiring authors to assign both the 
copyright and the renewal right.59  Thus, the renewal right 
was left worthless in regard to its most important use. 
C. The 1976 Act’s Termination Provisions 
Sweeping revisions were made with the 1976 Copyright 
Act in order to address the shortcomings of the previous 
system.  First, the two-term system of the initial copyright 
term and the renewal term was changed to a single term 
 
 53.  G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 54.  Chandra, supra note 22, at 251. 
 55.  Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: II, 45 COLUM. L. 
REV. 719, 722 (1945). 
 56.  Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 218-19 (1990); 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & 
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.02 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2011) (1963) 
(“[U]nlike real property and other forms of personal property, [a copyright] is by its very 
nature incapable of accurate monetary evaluation prior to its exploitation.”). 
 57.  Fred Fischer Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943).  The 
authors of the song “When Irish Eyes are Smiling” assigned both its initial and the 
renewal rights to Witmark.  Id. at 645.  When one of the authors renewed the rights in 
his own name, and assigned his renewal interest to Fischer, Witmark brought suit to 
enjoin Fischer from publishing and selling copies of the song.  Id. at 646. 
 58.  Id. at 659. 
 59.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5740. 
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period lasting the life of the author plus 50 years.60  As the 
Act took effect on January 1, 1978, works created on or prior 
to December 31, 1977 still need to be renewed in the manner 
of the 1909 Act.61  However, the 1976 Act granted an 
additional 19-year renewal term for such works (making the 
renewal term for applicable works run for a maximum of 47 
years).62  The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 
further extended this period by 20 years; thus making 
copyright last for the life of an author plus 70 years, and for 
works of corporate authorship to 120 years after creation or 
95 years after publication, whichever is earlier.63  For works 
that were in their renewal term, an extra 20 years was added 
onto the 47-year term.64 
Second, Congress instituted a new non-waivable right for 
authors who previously assigned their copyrights to another 
party in sections 203 and 304(c) of the 1976 Act, which allows 
these authors to terminate their transfers.65  Furthermore, 
Congress included the language, “notwithstanding an 
agreement to the contrary,” to Section 304(c).66  This ensures 
that an author could not contract this right away, removing 
the pitfall of the 1909 Act.  The 1909 Act had been deemed a 
failure due to its inability to provide authors with 
remunerative rights after they had assigned the renewal term 
in their copyrighted work before its true value could be 
ascertained.67  Congress sought to fix the problem by allowing 
copyright law to trump contract law. 
Sections 304(c) and 203 are similar for the most part.68  
Section 203 addresses the reversionary rights of authors who 
created works after December 31, 1977,69 while section 304(c) 
retroactively grants a termination right to authors of works 
 
 60.  17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). 
 61.  See id. § 304. 
 62.  See id. § 304(a)(2). 
 63.  See id.  § 302, amended by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 
Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
 64.  See id. § 304(a), amended by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 
Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827.  
 65.  See id. §§ 203, 304(c) (2006). 
 66.  See id. § 304(c)(5). 
 67.  Chandra, supra note 22 at 264. 
 68.  17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(1), (2), (4), (5), 304(c)(2), (4), (5). 
 69.  See id. § 203. 
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created before January 1, 1978.70  For section 203, 
“[t]ermination of the grant may be effected at any time during 
a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years 
from the date of execution of the grant.”71  If the grant also 
included the right of publication, then the five-year 
reclamation period begins “at the end of thirty-five years from 
the date of publication … or at the end of forty years from the 
date of execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier.”72  
Similarly, section 304(c) allows authors or their statutory 
heirs a right to terminate a grant in a copyright during a 
window period of five years, which would begin fifty-six years 
after the original grant was made.73 
D. Reasons Behind the 1976 Act’s Changes 
Clearly, the 1976 amendments were meant to benefit 
authors.74  By extending the duration of existing copyrights 
and providing a longer term for new copyrights, along with 
the new, highly author-protective termination rights, 
Congress “obviously intended to make the rewards for the 
creativity of authors more substantial.”75  Specifically, 
through the termination rights granted by the 1976 Act, 
Congress was tackling the same issue that they had similarly 
attempted to address with a separate renewal right.76  The 
Witmark decision had ensured that renewal rights as they 
stood under the 1909 Act would not offer authors protection 
from poor dealings, as Congress had desired.77  As recognized 
by the Supreme Court, like the renewal right before it, the 
termination right was enacted with the express purpose of 
providing respite for those authors who made “ill-advised and 
unremunerative grants” of their copyrights before there was a 
fair chance for the author to “appreciate the true value of his 
 
 70.  See id. § 304(c). 
 71.  See id. § 203(a)(3). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. § 304(c)(3).  
 74.  Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172 (1985). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976) (“A provision of this sort is needed 
because of the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the 
impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been exploited”). 
 77.  See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
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work product.”78 
The termination provisions would serve as a compromise, 
attempting to ease the existing problems and legitimate need 
to rectify the disparity of bargaining power between 
publishers and authors, while also furthering the objectives of 
copyright law.79  By providing authors with such favor and 
added protection, Congress created a more enticing reward for 
authors to release their works to the public.80  Additionally, 
the termination right would also serve the purpose of solving 
another issue created by the term extensions that came with 
the 1976 Act’s amendments. 
In creating the additional 19-year term extension for 
works created prior to January 1, 1978, Congress had created 
a new property right that would strictly benefit the author or 
the assignee of the work.81  Since Congress wanted authors to 
be the beneficiaries of copyright law, the termination right 
would ensure that authors were the ones who received the 
profits from the newly extended copyright period.82  Congress 
also did not want to give the assignee a potential windfall, 
because bargained-for assignments executed before the 
passage of the 1976 Act likely would not have contemplated 
compensation for the new extension of the copyright term.83  
However, Congress realized either the author or the assignee 
would receive this windfall.84  Since Congress intended the 
new rights to benefit authors, the termination rights allowed 
the author to receive the windfall, “assuming the work is 
profitable and the author or his heirs desire to reclaim it.”85 
Considering these longstanding attempts by Congress to 
provide authors with increased rights and protections for 
 
 78.  Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 172-73 (“[T]he termination right was expressly 
intended to relieve authors of the consequences of ill-advised and unremunerative 
grants that had been made before the author had a fair opportunity to appreciate the 
true value of his work product. That general purpose is plainly defined in the legislative 
history and, indeed, is fairly inferable from the text of § 304 itself”). 
 79.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). 
 80.  See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. 
 81.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 140 (1976). 
 82.  See id. 
 83.  See id. at 141. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id.; John Molinaro, Who Owns Captain America? Contested Ownership, Work-
for-Hire, and Termination Rights Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 21 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 
565, 573-74 (2004). 
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their work, and the justifications that are provided for doing 
so, one can see how natural moral rights may be an implicit 
factor in this aspect of American copyright law.  Obviously, 
there is something morally compelling about an author 
fighting to reclaim his creations,86 and courts may be sensitive 
to the author’s plight.  Some commentators argue that courts 
are not immune to such considerations.  They assert that 
while decisions are not expressly based on moral rights, there 
is sometimes an observable willingness to factor moral rights 
concerns into the determination.87  This willingness can be 
best evinced by decisions that focus less on the economic 
implications and contractual obligations created by the 
parties but instead opt to factor natural moral rights concerns 
into the equation.88 
Regardless, the result of the 1976 Act is that authors are 
meant to be placed in a more favorable position than ever 
before.89  Yet, while authors who have assigned their rights 
are blessed with these benefits, it is a different story for those 
who have made works on a “for-hire” basis, as Congress has 
expressly prevented this group of creators from exercising this 
termination right.90 
II. WORK-FOR-HIRE DOCTRINE 
To one that is unfamiliar, a work-for-hire may not seem 
that different than an assignment.  In both cases one 
individual creates a work and another individual or entity 
owns the copyright in that work.  While the difference 
between a work-for-hire and an assignment of rights in a 
work may seem slight in some instances, there is, in fact, a 
critical distinction.  Termination is available to original 
 
 86.  McGilvray, supra note 23 at 335. 
 87.  Id. at 333.  McGilvray specifically discusses the decision rendered in Siegel v. 
Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2008), as an example of how 
an author’s moral rights can be a factor in American copyright law. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172 (1985) (“The principal purpose of 
the amendments in § 304 was to provide added benefits to authors. The extension of the 
duration of existing copyrights to 75 years, the provision of a longer term (the author’s 
life plus 50 years) for new copyrights, and the concept of a termination right itself, were 
all obviously intended to make the rewards for the creativity of authors more 
substantial.”). 
 90.  17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c) (2006). 
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creators who have assigned the copyrights to their works, but 
Congress has explicitly excluded creators of work-for-hire 
material from exercising this termination right.91 
Copyright protection initially vests with the author or 
creator of a work; however this is not without exception.92  
When a work is “made-for-hire” the employer or other entity 
commissioning the work is instead considered the author of 
the work, even though the original creator never assigned or 
bargained away the rights in the work.93  Thus, the original 
creator of a work-for-hire “falls outside the scope of the policy 
rationales that led to the creation of the [1976 Act’s] 
termination right.”94 
This being so, whether a work can be considered “for-hire” 
will often be a critical issue in copyright assignment 
termination cases.  The analysis used to determine whether a 
particular work is a work-for-hire will depend on which 
copyright act applies.95  Works made before January 1, 1978 
are governed by the 1909 Act, while works made after that 
date are governed by the 1976 Act.96  Each act has a different 
definition of what qualifies as a work for hire.97 
A. Works-for-Hire under the Copyright Act of 1909 
While the 1976 Act has laid out detailed definitions of 
work-for-hire,98 the 1909 Act mentions the work-for-hire 
doctrine only once: “In the interpretation and construction of 
this title…the word ‘author’ shall include an employer in the 
case of works made for hire.”99  The terms “employer” and 
“works made for hire” are not defined in the 1909 Copyright 
 
 91.  See Id. §§ 203, 304(c). 
 92.  See id. § 201. 
 93.  Id.; Penguin Group Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193, 203 (2d Cir. 2008); Terry 
Hart, Marvel v. Kirby: Work for Hire and Copyright Termination, COPYHYPE (Aug. 3, 
2011), http://www.copyhype.com/2011/08/marvel-v-kirby-work-for-hire-and-copyright-
termination/. 
 94.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976); Molinaro, supra, note 85 at 574. 
 95.  Hart, supra, note 93. 
 96.  Id.; Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d 720, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(citing Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
 97.  Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006), with 17 U.S.C. § 26 (repealed 1976), reprinted 
in 8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 6 § 26. 
 98.  17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (2012). 
 99.  17 U.S.C. § 26 (repealed 1976), reprinted in 8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 6 § 
26. 
MURRAY_HEROES FOR HI RE 4/17/2013  4:07 PM 
426 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 23.2 
 
Act; instead, that task was left to the courts.100  Thus, courts 
generally applied the work-for-hire doctrine only in cases 
involving a traditional employer/employee relationship until 
the mid-1960s.101  However, in 1965, the Ninth Circuit became 
the first to apply the doctrine to a case in which an employer 
commissioned a work by an independent contractor.102  This 
was the origin of what became known as the “instance and 
expense” test.”103  The court held that where one person 
engages another to create a “work of an artistic nature,” the 
presumption arises that the copyright belongs to “the person 
at whose instance and expense the work is done.”104 
Other circuits also came to adopt the instance and expense 
test created by the Ninth Circuit,105 most notably the Second 
Circuit, “where a majority of copyright cases are litigated,”106 
including the Kirby case.107  In Battleboro Publishing Co. v. 
Winmill Publishing Corp., the Second Circuit explicitly 
adopted the Ninth Circuit’s Gertler holding in which the court 
found that an independent contractor is an "employee" and a 
hiring party an "employer" for purposes of the statute if the 
work is made at the hiring party's "instance and expense.”108  
The “instance and expense” test is met “when the motivating 
factor in producing the work was the employer who induced 
the creation,”109 and the employer has the right to “direct and 
supervise the manner in which the work is carried out.”110 
 
 100.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 737. 
 101.  Dumas, 53 F.3d at 554 (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 
490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989)). 
 102.  Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965). 
 103.  Hart, supra note 93. 
 104.  Gertler, 352 F.2d at 300 (“When one person engages another, whether as 
employee or as an independent contractor, to produce a work of an artistic nature . . . 
the presumption arises that the mutual intent of the parties is that the title to the 
copyright shall be in the person at whose instance and expense the work is done”). 
 105.  See, e.g., Murray v. Gelderman, 563 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 106.  Hart, supra note 93 (citing Brattleboro Publ’g Co. v. Winmill Publ’g Corp., 369 
F.2d 565, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1966)). 
 107.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 738. 
 108.  Brattleboro Publ’g, 369 F.2d at 567-68. 
 109.  Siegel v. National Periodical Publ’ns, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(quoting Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 110.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 738 (quoting Martha Graham Sch. and Dance 
Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 634-35 
(2d Cir. 2004)). 
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To meet the “instance” prong, while the commissioning 
party’s inducement must serve as the motivating factor, it is 
not a but-for test, i.e. “but for the artist’s employment the 
work would not have been created.”111  Rather, the courts 
engage in a narrower inquiry based on the nature and scope 
of the business between the parties.112  Furthermore, a 
written agreement is not necessary to prove that a work was 
made at the “instance” of the hiring party.113  The focus is 
instead placed on the actual relationship between the parties, 
and the determinative question will be whether the hiring 
party had the power to control or supervise the creator’s 
work.114 
Within the Second Circuit, the “expense” prong will be 
satisfied in a situation where a “hiring party simply pays an 
independent contractor for…his or her work.”115  However, 
where the creator of a work is instead granted royalties as 
payment, such method of payment would weigh against the 
finding of a work being one created “for-hire.”116  The focus of 
this prong rests on which party bore the risk of the work’s 
profitability.117  The Second Circuit’s jurisprudence creates 
“an almost irrebuttable presumption that any person who 
paid another to create a copyrightable work was the statutory 
‘author’ under the ‘work for hire’ doctrine.”118 
B. Works-for-Hire under the Copyright Act of 1976 
The work-for-hire doctrine is more specific and limited 
under the provisions of the 1976 Act.  The 1976 Act included 
new work-for-hire provisions, which laid out more detailed 
 
 111.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 738 (citing Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entertainment 
Inc., 658 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2009)). 
 112.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 738. 
 113.  Id. at 741. 
 114.  Id. (citing Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552-53 (2d Cir. 
1984); Playboy, 53 F.3d at  554).  
 115.  Id. (quoting Playboy, 53 F.3d at 555).  In Playboy, the fact that Playboy paid 
the artist a fixed sum for each of the works that were in turn published in their 
magazine was enough to satisfy the “expense” requirement of the instance and expense 
test.  Playboy, 53 F.3d at 555. 
 116.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 742 (quoting Playboy, 53 F.3d at 555). 
 117.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 742 (quoting Siegel, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 1058) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 118.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 738 (quoting Estate of Burne Hogarth v. Edgar Rice 
Burroughs, Inc., 342 F.3d 149, 158 (2d Cir. 2003)) (internal quotations omitted). 
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definitions of the doctrine than had previously been 
statutorily available under the 1909 Act.119 “These provisions 
represent a deliberate attempt by Congress to apportion 
copyright entitlements in such a way as to appease both 
‘employers/buyers’ and ‘employees/sellers’ of copyrightable 
works.”120  17 U.S.C. § 101 splits the term “work made for 
hire” into two categories. 121  First, “a work prepared by an 
employee within the scope of his or her employment” will be 
considered a “work made for hire.”122  Second, a work that is 
“specially ordered or commissioned” will also be considered a 
“work made for hire,” however, the parties must expressly 
agree that the work will be considered as such in a written 
and signed instrument.123 
This construction greatly limits the circumstances in 
which the work of an independent contractor may be 
considered a work-for-hire.  Works created by an independent 
contractor must fall within the second subsection of the 
definition provided under §101 and therefore must fit into one 
of the enumerated categories.124  Furthermore, the parties 
(commissioning entity and independent contractor) must 
expressly agree in writing that the work will be considered a 
work-for-hire.125  Finally, since Congress has included a 
definition in the 1976 Act, “the Supreme Court held that the 
‘instance and expense’ test does not apply for works created 
under the 1976 Act.”126 
While the Supreme Court held that the “instance and 
expense” test would no longer be utilized for newly created 
works, it also rejected the notion that the term “employee” 
 
 119.  17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (2006). 
 120.  Michael Carter Smith, Work For Hire: Revision on the Horizon, 30 IDEA 21, 21 
(1989). 
 121.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘work made for hire’ is (1) a work prepared by an employee 
within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or 
commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a 
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an 
atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the 
work shall be considered a work made for hire.”). 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Hart, supra note 93 (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 
U.S. 730 (1989)). 
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should be limited to “formal, salaried” employees.127  Instead, 
common law rules of agency will control a court’s 
determination as to whether a work was created within the 
scope of employment.128  “These rules place the actual nature 
of the relationship between the two parties above whatever 
language issued in any written agreements between them.”129  
Therefore, it is recognized that the 1976 Act is far more artist-
friendly than the 1909 Act.  The 1976 Act substantially 
narrows the scope of works-for-hire when the party 
commissioned to create the work is not an employee of the 
commissioning party.130 
Whether a particular work is a work-made-for-hire or not 
has numerous implications, but the doctrine is especially 
significant when it relates to the question of a creator’s 
termination rights.131  This is the central issue at play in 
Kirby. 
III. BACKGROUND AND THE CASE: MARVEL WORLDWIDE, INC. V. 
KIRBY 
A. History Behind the Case 
Circa 1940, artist Jack Kirby, along with longtime 
collaborator and fellow legend in the comic book industry, Joe 
Simon,132 produced comics for a man named Martin Goodman 
at a company called Timely Comics (“Timely”), the 
predecessor to Marvel.133  Simon was then serving as the first 
editor of Timely.134  At some point during the 1940s, both 
Kirby and Simon left the employ of Timely, leaving the 
company with a vacant editor position.135  In the meantime, 
 
 127.  Reid, 490 U.S. at 742 n.8. 
 128.  Id. at 751. 
 129.  Hart, supra note 93. 
 130.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 737 n.2.  
 131.  See Mills Musics, supra note 78. 
 132.  Simon and Kirby jointly created Captain America and a number of other comic 
book series such as “The Sandman,” “The Newsboy Legion,” and “The Boy 
Commandos.”  Comiclopedia: Joe Simon, LAMBIEK COMIX-STRIPS, http://lambiek.net/ 
artists/s/simon-joe.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). 
 133.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 731. 
 134.  Biography of Joe Simon, MARVEL COMICS DATABASE, http://marvel.wikia.com/ 
Joe_Simon (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). 
 135.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 731. 
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Goodman asked an assistant at Timely whose previous duties 
included sharpening pencils, fetching lunch, and erasing 
pages, to function as editor and art director until he found a 
suitable replacement for the position.136  That assistant was 
none other than Stan Lee, who Goodman never replaced, and 
who remained editor at Marvel until the early 1970s.137 
Thus, during the period in which the Kirby works that 
became the subject of this lawsuit were created, Lee was 
serving as art director and editor.138  In this capacity, Lee 
developed the ideas and stories for all of Timely’s comic books 
at the time.139  He was responsible for the “creative editorial 
aspects” of the comics published.140  Lee supervised the 
creation of the comic books from beginning until end and 
nothing was published without his approval.141  Lee assigned 
artists to work, edited or even completely changed their work, 
set deadlines for submissions, and gave artists directions and 
guidelines as to what they should draw.142  Lee could make 
any changes to artwork or scripts that he deemed fit, often 
without consulting the artist or writer.143 
It was amid this setting that Kirby returned to Marvel and 
contributed to the creation of several comic book characters 
including the Fantastic Four, Spider-man, Thor, the X-Men, 
and the Hulk.144  Most, if not all, of Kirby’s contributions to 
 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 731. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 732-34.  Specifically, Kirby’s contributions are as follows: The Fantastic 
Four: In 1961, after Lee was told by Goodman to create a team of superheroes to 
compete with National Comics’ (a predecessor to DC Comics) “The Justice League of 
America,” Kirby and Lee discussed ideas for the first issue at a plotting conference.  
Kirby subsequently produced the pencil drawings for the issue; The Incredible Hulk: 
Co-created by Lee and Kirby in 1962.  Kirby drew the first issue; The Mighty Thor: 
First published in 1962, Lee created a plot synopsis and another writer, Lawrence 
Lieber, wrote the script for the first issue.  Kirby drew the art for the first issue; Spider-
Man: In 1962, Lee developed the initial concept and assigned Kirby to create the first 
issue’s artwork.  Lee did not like Kirby’s initial pencil drawings of the character and 
reassigned the comic book to artist Steve Ditko.  Kirby then drew the cover for Spider-
man’s first appearance in the comic book “Amazing Fantasy”; Iron Man: Also written by 
Lieber, based on a plot conceived by Lee, the character would first appear in “Tales of 
Suspense” in 1963.  Kirby drew the cover of the issue, but did not contribute to the 
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these creations were made through a collaborative process 
termed the “Marvel Method.”145  Under this system, artists 
would meet with Lee for a “plotting conference” where Lee 
would describe his general ideas for the story to the artists.146  
Then, the artist would draw the story along the lines of Lee’s 
main theme, thus allowing artists to work before actually 
being given a script.147  This allowed Lee to keep multiple 
artists working on assignments simultaneously while 
providing the artists greater opportunity for involvement in 
the creative process.148 
Even under the Marvel Method, artists did not work “on 
spec;”149 they began to draw only after receiving an 
assignment and plot synopsis from Lee.150  Artists were 
always constrained by Lee’s plotlines and Lee retained the 
right to edit or alter the artists’ works.151  Lee could even 
reject them altogether.152  On occasion, Lee did exercise these 
powers and would ask artists such as Kirby to make changes 
to their works.153  Kirby always obliged these requests.154 
Kirby did much of the work in his own home, using his 
own tools and supplies.155  He worked 12-14 hours a day, was 
 
other artwork; The X-Men: In 1963, due to the popularity of the Fantastic Four, 
Goodman asked Lee to create another superhero team.  Lee conceived the idea and 
Kirby drew the artwork for their first appearance; The Avengers: Together in 1962, Lee 
and Kirby developed another team of superheroes that would consist of other existing 
Marvel characters.  Lee created the initial plot and Kirby drew the first issue, 
published in 1963; Ant-Man: First published in 1962, Lee had the idea for a miniature 
superhero.  Lieber wrote the script and Kirby drew the pencil artwork for the first 
issue; Nick Fury: Based on a discontinued series from the World War II era, “Sgt. Fury 
and His Howling Commandos,” Lee brought the character back to life and oversaw 
production using the Marvel Method.  Kirby was assigned to draw the artwork for the 
new series, which would be first published in 1963; The Rawhide Kid: Because 
Goodman enjoyed westerns and titles that used the word “kid,” Lee developed this 
comic book, writing the first issue.  Kirby drew the pencil artwork.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 732. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 732. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  On a speculation basis; with no assurance of profit.  THE FREE DICTIONARY, 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/on+spec (last visited Feb 22, 2013). 
 150.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 732. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at 731. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. at 741. 
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paid on a flat per-page basis, and never received royalties for 
his work.156  He worked his own hours and paid his own taxes 
and benefits.157  There was no written agreement between him 
and Marvel during this time.158  In the spring of 1972, long 
after the creation of all of the works at issue in the case, 
Marvel and Kirby executed a written agreement which 
assigned to Magazine Management Company, another Marvel 
predecessor, “any and all right, title, and interest [Kirby] may 
have or control” in all of the work that he created for 
Marvel.159  Kirby eventually died in 1994.160  He was survived 
by his wife and their four children.161 
B. The Decision of the Southern District of New York 
The lawsuit began in September 2009.162  The attorney to 
the estate, Marc Toberoff, has garnered some fame through 
his past involvement in lawsuits on behalf of people who 
created properties that have been exploited by large 
companies for huge amounts of money.163  Perhaps most well-
known from his representation of the families of Jerome 
Siegel and Joe Shuster, the original creators of Superman, 
Toberoff is responsible for recently obtaining a key ruling in 
2008 in favor of the Siegels against DC Comics.164  This time, 
Toberoff would see a different result. 
Since the works in question were created before January 1, 
1978, the Copyright Act of 1909 controlled the analysis as to 
whether the material would be considered a work-for-hire.165  
 
 156.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp 2d at 732, 743; Paul Fakler, Doctor Doom Prevails: SDNY 
Holds Jack Kirby’s Iconic Contributions to Marvel Comics Characters Were Works for 
Hire, TITLE 17: THE S(C)ITE FOR COPYRIGHT LAW (July 29, 2011), 
http://title17.net/2011/07/doctor-doom-prevails-sdny-holds-jack-kirbys-iconic-
contributions-to-marvel-comics-characters-were-works-for-hire/. 
 157.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 741. 
 158.  Id.  
 159.  Id. at 734. 
 160.  Id. at 724. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id.; Belloni, supra note 5.  
 163.  Matt Rorie, Marvel Wins Big In Jack Kirby Estate Lawsuit, SCREENED NEWS 
(July 28, 2011), http://www.screened.com/news/marvel-wins-big-in-jack-kirby-estate-
lawsuit/2665/. 
 164.  Id.; Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 165.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 737 (citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 
549, 553 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
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As mentioned in the previous section, a work must satisfy the 
instance and expense tests to be considered a work-for-hire 
under the 1909 Act.166  Under the instance and expense tests, 
which are less rigid than that used for works made under the 
Copyright Act of 1976, a creation is considered a work-for-hire 
when the “motivating factor in producing the work was the 
employer who induced the creation”167 and the commissioning 
party has the right to “direct and supervise the manner in 
which the work is carried out.”168 
The court found that the evidence offered to show that 
Kirby’s works were made at Marvel’s instance was 
“overwhelming.”169  This finding was supported by a simple, 
yet crucial, fact – Kirby did not work until he was told to do so 
by Lee. 170  The court struck down the Kirby estate’s argument 
that there was no written agreement between Kirby and 
Marvel, and therefore no legal right to control Kirby’s work, 
because a written agreement was not essential to the creation 
of a contractual relationship.171  When it looked at the actual 
relationship of the parties, the court concluded that it was 
undisputed that “Marvel did control and supervise all work 
that it published between 1958 and 1963.”172 
The court found that the expense prong was in Marvel’s 
favor as well, since it was Marvel, not Kirby, who bore the 
risk of the comic books’ failure.173  This decision was made 
despite the acknowledgment that Kirby had to use his own 
tools and supplies to create the works for Marvel.174  
Furthermore, it did not matter that there was no legal 
obligation on Marvel’s part to purchase all the work that 
Kirby submitted, or that Marvel on occasion had rejected 
 
 166.  Brattleboro Publ’g Co. v. Winmill Publ’g Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567-68 (2d Cir. 
1966). 
 167.  Nat’l Periodical Publ’ns, Inc., 508 F.2d at 914 (quoting Picture Music, Inc. v. 
Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972)). 
 168.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 738 (quoting Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., 
Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 635 (2d Cir. 
2004)). 
 169.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 742. 
 170.  Id. at 739. 
 171.  Id. at 741. 
 172.  Id. (emphasis omitted).  
 173.  Id. at 743. 
 174.  Id. at 741. 
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Kirby's work, or told him to revise it.175  Rather it mattered 
which party bore the risk for the entire product, the published 
comic book itself.176  Regardless of the comic book’s eventual 
success, Marvel bore the cost of printing the book and paid 
the artists their fees before publication.177 
Furthermore, the manner in which Kirby was paid for his 
work supported a finding for Marvel.178  The Second Circuit 
views the payment of a flat sum for work sufficient to meet 
the expense test.179  Therefore, the fact that Kirby was paid a 
flat sum for each page he submitted, and was not paid any 
royalties, persuaded the court to rule against the Kirby 
estate.180 
The court’s findings made Marvel the presumptive author 
of Kirby’s creations unless Kirby’s heirs could rebut this 
“almost irrebuttable presumption” with evidence to the 
contrary.181  Unfortunately for the Kirby estate, the court 
found the evidence that was proffered unconvincing and that 
it did not even make a “dent in the almost irrebuttable 
presumption.”182  The Kirby heirs attempted to utilize the 
1972 Agreement as proof that Kirby had a right in the works, 
which were subsequently contracted away through the 
agreement.183  The court disagreed.184  It found that the 1972 
Agreement did not offer evidence that Kirby had any rights to 
give away in the beginning, but merely that he gave away any 
rights he “may” have had.185 
The Kirby heirs emphasized that the 1972 Agreement 
included a provision assigning “any and all right, title and 
interest [Kirby] may have or control” to Marvel.186  They 
argued that this provision made no sense if Marvel already 
owned the copyrights on Kirby’s creations as works made-for-
 
 175.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 742. 
 176.  Id. at 743. 
 177.  Id. at 742. 
 178.  Id. at 743. 
 179.  Id. at 741-42. 
 180.  Id. at 732, 743. 
 181.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 743, 750. 
 182.  Id. at 750. 
 183.  Id. at 744. 
 184.  Id. at 745-46. 
 185.  Id. at 745. 
 186.  Id. at 744. 
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hire.187  Nonetheless, the court was not receptive to the 
argument.  Relying on the date the 1972 Agreement was 
executed, the court held that the parties likely entered into 
this agreement because of Marvel’s uneasiness over 
uncertainty caused by the 1976 Act and its limited definition 
of works-for-hire, even though the 1976 Act would not apply 
to works made before 1978.188  The agreement also likely 
sought to eliminate any form of common law copyright claims 
that Kirby could have over the works.189  This was because 
prior to the 1976 Act, common law copyrights existed in 
unpublished work.190  Entering into the 1972 Agreement 
ensured that Kirby could not bring claims over any of his 
unpublished material, such as the works rejected by Lee.191 
Thus, the court found that the Kirby works were created 
on a work-for-hire basis, which precluded the Kirby estate 
from terminating Marvel’s copyrights under the 1976 Act. 
CONCLUSION 
While Congress may have created the termination of 
transfer provisions in the 1976 Act to allow authors a second 
chance to benefit from their works,192 it did not mean to place 
authors in a better position than publishers.  The goal was 
merely to level the playing field and address the gross 
inequality between these two parties that had previously 
existed.193  This is the reason that the work-for-hire doctrine 
still exists and continues to serve a crucial place in copyright 
law.  The continued observance of the doctrine is meant to 
benefit publishers and other entities that commission creators 
in their works, ensuring that they still have some power in 
the face of the new rights granted to creators by the 1976 Act. 
The creators of works that have been made on a “for-hire” 
basis are not those who Congress sought to afford added 
protections with the 1976 Act’s termination provisions.194  The 
 
 187.  Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 744. 
 188.  Id. at 745-46. 
 189.  Id. at 746. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id.  
 192.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  See supra Parts I(d) and II. 
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policy rationales and other considerations that spurred 
Congress to enact these changes to the copyright law simply 
do not exist in the work-for-hire context.195  Thus, the creator 
of a work-for-hire is not entitled to the same treatment as an 
author of a work that has been assigned to another party.  
While to some this may seem harsh, this is a necessary result. 
The work-for-hire doctrine is situated in a critical position 
in achieving the goals of copyright law – the inducement of 
creators to share their works with the public.196  Through this 
doctrine, commissioning entities, such as publishers, have an 
incentive to enter into relationships with creators that result 
in the issuance of creative goods to the market.  While we 
may often perceive a copyrighted work as being the fruit of 
the creator’s labors, the commissioning entity frequently 
makes a substantial contribution to its creation as well.  In 
many cases, had it not been for the commissioning party’s 
funding of the creator or its undertaking of the risk in the 
success of a work, the material may never have found its way 
into the public’s hands. 
The comic book industry itself is a great example of the 
benefits of the work-for-hire doctrine.  Without the doctrine, 
these characters could not have been developed to the extent 
that they have been through these many decades with the 
input of multiple artists, writers, editors, and other such 
creators.  By allowing publishers, such as Marvel or DC 
Comics, to maintain ownership of these copyrights, the 
characters were able to grow and evolve well beyond their 
initial conception. 
These properties also benefit from the publisher’s often-
vast resources, whether it is monetary or otherwise.  It is 
through these resources and investments that mechanisms 
such as advertising and merchandising can be utilized, 
contributing to the success of the property.  More likely than 
not, writers, artists, and other such creators simply do not 
have the same ability to exploit such opportunities.  Thus, 
while these creators may have created the artistic work, its 
overall success may be more attributable to the toils of the 
publisher who holds the copyright. 
 
 195.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121; Molinaro, supra note 85, at 574. 
 196.  1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03; see United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 
334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). 
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Courts must be cautious when such disputes over 
ownership rights arise.  These cases are particularly 
vulnerable to abuse resulting from emotional appeal.  It is 
romantic to think of an author suing the large corporation to 
re-obtain the works that he put his heart and soul into.  But 
judges cannot be controlled by their emotional impulses; 
rather, they must adhere to the law.  That is what Judge 
McMahon knew when she decided Kirby. 
In a commendable fashion, Judge McMahon quickly 
separated the emotional aspects of the case from the legal 
analysis at the outset of her opinion.197  The case was not 
about whether Kirby and other freelance artists who worked 
for Marvel were treated “fairly” when Marvel grew rich off of 
the characters they helped create.198  It was about whether 
Kirby’s work qualified as a work-for-hire under the 1909 
Act.199  And the court found that it did.200 
The Southern District of New York was correct in its 
decision.  A contrary ruling would have resulted in an unfair 
windfall for the Kirby estate.  There has been exceptional 
success with these properties, perhaps best exemplified by the 
huge box office success of comic book films such as The Dark 
Knight, Iron Man, and Spider-Man.201  It would be difficult to 
determine how much of that success is owed to the original 
creator and how much is owed to the efforts of the publisher 
 
 197.  Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“At 
the outset, it is important to state what this motion is not about.  Contrary to recent 
press accounts and editorials, this case is not about whether Jack Kirby or Stan Lee is 
the real ‘creator’ of Marvel characters, or whether Kirby (and other freelance artists 
who created culturally iconic comic book characters for Marvel and other publishers) 
were treated ‘fairly’ by companies that grew rich off the fruit of their labor.  It is about 
whether Kirby’s work qualifies as work-for-hire under the Copyright Act of 1909, as 
interpreted by the courts, notably the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit.  If it does, then Marvel owns the copyright in the Kirby Works, whether that is 
‘fair’ or not.  If it does not, then the Kirby Heirs have a statutory right to take back 
those copyrights, no matter the impact on a recent corporate acquisition or on earnings 
from blockbuster movies made and yet to be made.”) (citation omitted).  
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. at 750. 
 201.  All three of these films have made it to the Top 50 List in domestic grosses 
with, as of February 9, 2013, The Dark Knight earning $534,858,444, Spider-Man 
earning $403,706,375, and Iron Man earning $318,412,101.  Domestic Grosses, BOX 
OFFICE MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/alltime/domestic.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 
2013). 
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and the many others who contributed to the development of 
these characters through the years.  Furthermore, a victory 
for the Kirby estate would have likely opened the floodgates 
to mass-litigation commenced by others hoping to get their 
hands on at least a sliver of these highly lucrative pieces of 
intellectual property.202 
 
 
 202.  See Molinaro, supra note 85, at 590. 
